Online social media (OSM) has a great influence in todays' world. Some individuals view OSM as fertile ground for abuse and use it to disseminate misinformation, political propaganda, slander competitors, and spread spam. The crowdturfing industry employs large numbers of bots and human workers to manipulate OSM and misrepresent public opinion. The detection of online discussion topics manipulated by OSM abusers is an emerging problem attracting significant attention. In this paper we propose an approach for quantifying the authenticity of online discussions based on the similarity of OSM accounts participating in the discussion to known abusers and legitimate accounts. Our method uses multiple similarity functions for the analysis and classification of OSM accounts. The proposed methods are demonstrated using Twitter data collected for this study and previously published Arabic Honeypots data. The former includes manually labeled accounts and abusers who participated in crowdturfing platforms. Demonstration of the topic's authenticity, derived from account similarity functions, shows that the suggested approach is effective for discriminating between topics that were strongly promoted by abusers and topics that attracted authentic public interest.
I. INTRODUCTION
Online social media (OSM) allows people to share opinions and content, and in some cases, influence large segments of society [1] , [2] , [3] . Significant attention has been payed to trends emerging from OSM [4] . Machiavellian individuals and organizations often attempt to harness the power of OSM in order to gain influence, damage competitor's reputation, or spread political propaganda by financing disinformation campaigns [5] , [6] , [7] . Such campaigns are called to as crowdturfing, stemming from crowdsourcing 1 and astroturfing 2 .
Crowdturfing campaigns in many cases utilize OSM accounts, operated by humans [5] , [6] or by computer programs known as bots [8] , [9] . These malicious accounts may cause serious damage. For example, in 2014, tweets posted by socialbots influenced automated trading algorithms, causing a boost in the stock market prices of a tech company whose stock value jumped 200-fold, increasing the company's market value to five billion dollars in a matter of weeks [9] . In another case, Vietnamese officials employed a large number of crowdturfers to engage in online discussions to spread messages in support of the ruling political party's policies [2] . More recently, fake news was reported to proliferate in the US and European political arena [10] , [11] . All of these examples demonstrate the need for comprehensive solutions to tackle OSM manipulation by crowdturfers [12] .
In this study we strive to discriminate between authentic online discussions and crowdturfing campaigns. Online discussions propagated by crowdturfers do not necessarily reflect authentic public opinion. Today, extensive research is being conducted in the area of detecting OSM abusers such as spammers, bots, trolls, etc [6] , [7] , [9] . However, it is not always possible to identify an account as a human or bot, because of the prevalence of semi-automated accounts within OSM [13] . Similarly, it not always possible to differentiate between crowdturfers and grassroots efforts to promote an area of online discussion.
Further complicating matters, casual crowdturfers are OSM accounts that largely exhibit authentic behavior, but occasionally participate in malicious manipulation of OSM discussions [6] , [14] . This type of behavior in which abusers attempt to appear as regular accounts as much as possible is known as camouflage [15] , [16] . Therefore, quantifying the level of authenticity of an OSM account remains challenging.
In this study we propose similarity functions for comparing OSM accounts, participating in a particular online discussion, to both confirmed OSM abusers and to known legitimate accounts. These similarity functions can be used to quantify the level of account's authenticity, where abusers and legitimate accounts are placed on the opposite ends of the authenticity scale. Accounts' authenticity can, in turn, be aggregated to quantify the authenticity of online discussions. We demonstrate that the distribution of accounts' authenticity is different in topics that are prone to OSM manipulation and in topics that attract authentic public interest. In order to choose the best similarity function we used three Twitter 3 datasets, two of which were collected during this study and one was made available by Morstatter et al. [17] .
The contributions of this paper are:
• a collection of two Twitter datasets that include 605 manually labeled accounts, 1,006 abusers who participated in crowdturfing platforms, and 88,506 unlabeled accounts (the data is available upon request);
• an application of text kernels for account type classification; • a visual representation of the account authenticity distribution within OSM discussions; Credibility of online information has been discussed in [18] , however, as the researchers mention their approach considers shallow characteristics alone (i.e., number of followers). They do not distinguish between accounts who have accumulated a good reputation in the past, and those who have been spreading misinformation, Spam, etc. On the other hand, our approach does exactly the opposite, it analyzes all content published by the OSM accounts in order to provide a better prediction of OSM account authenticity. Intuitive visualization of the account authenticity distribution will help OSM analysts in identifying fake news, assessing public opinion about commercial products and services, identifying OSM manipulation in political campaigns, etc.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section II we review well-known methods for the detection of abusers, and review the concept of topic modeling. The datasets we evaluated our proposed method on are presented in Section IV-A. This section also includes a description of our datasets collection process, and the guidelines for manual labeling. We explain our approach for quantifying the authenticity of online discussions using similarity functions in Section III, and the visualization is presented in Section IV-C. We present the results of the evaluation carried out on the datasets in Section IV. Section V includes ethical considerations, and we conclude the paper in Section VI with a summary and introduction to future work.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we outline studies involving identification of abusers in OSM. In 2012, Cao et al. [19] proposed a method that is used to cluster accounts based on similarity of posted URLs; once this is done, each cluster is classified as either malicious or not by extracting behavioral, content features.
In 2013, a method for the identification of crowdturfers on Twitter was presented by Lee et al. [6] . Their method relies on extracting features, which are used to train and test supervised machine learning classifiers. The features extracted were associated with account properties, activity patterns, and linguistic properties.
In 2015, another crowdturfing detection approach was developed by Song et al. [20] . This approach identifies artificially promoted objects (such as posts, pages, and URLs), rather than crowdturfers or bots accounts. They described two types of malicious service provider websites: crowdturfing and black market websites. Black-market websites usually operate a large number of bots to perform promotion tasks in a given period of time; these bots resemble human accounts, however they operate as a group and their activities are synchronized, performing the same task with a single deadline. On the other hand, crowdturfing websites offer crowdturfers, which are either humans, or advanced human-like bots to execute their tasks. Song et al. found that the accounts of crowdturfers are more popular than normal accounts, and their activities are not synchronized. Later, they extracted features from retweeting patterns and used supervised machine learning algorithms to classify an object as artificially promoted or not.
Moreover, an approach for the detection of bots was introduced by Dickerson et al. [7] , which also used supervised machine learning classifiers based on features extracted from sentiment analysis, social network analysis, posted content, and account properties.
In 2016, Davis et al. [21] presented BotOrNot, a bot identification platform available through a web user interface. BotOrNot evaluates different aspects of Twitter accounts, including: social network connections, account properties, content, and behavioral features, as well as sentiment analysis.
Also in 2016, another bot detection method was introduced by Morstatter et al. [17] . In contrast to other similar studies [6] , [7] , [20] , [21] , their proposed method focused on a new supervised learning algorithm rather than feature extraction. Their classifier was based on AdaBoost [22] , a known boosting algorithm, which is intended to improve the F1 measure maintaining a balance between precision and recall. Morstatter et al. used LDA topic probability distributions as features to test their proposed approach.
The activities of accounts within the OSM are naturally reflected in the content of their posts. Some accounts publish posts mainly about cars, football, or their favorite movies. Merchandise or service advertisements spread by company accounts also have their own characteristic vocabulary. In contrast, accounts that "retweet for hire" may have no topical preference. Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) [23] can be used to identify the topics discussed in a large corpus of textual documents. Morstatter et al. [17] treated each account as a document consisting of the concatenation of all of the content of its tweets. The LDA model provided a probability distribution for each account for each topic. These probabilities were used as features to train an account classifier.
Although, topic detection was used in past to assist in identification of OSM abusers, to the best of our knowledge, current work is the first one focusing on detection of topics prone to OSM abuse.
While these studies introduce novel approaches to detect OSM abusers and/or promoted posts, none of them provides a mechanism to measure the impact that these OSM abusers have on online discussions.
Studies, such as [24] and [18] , focus on information credibility in social media. Castillo et. al [18] , studies the propagation of false rumors on Twitter during a crisis event. This approach is composed of three parts: emerging event detection, manual labeling, and feature extraction.
The first part consists of collecting information cascades which are collections of messages related to specific events. This step relies on a third-party tool called Twitter Monitor 4 , which receives as input a query composed of keywords and logical propositions and return the relevant set of messages.
These cascades are then manually labeled using crowdsourcing Mechanical Turk. Finally, several factors observed in the OSM are used to derive features such as: sentiments expressed in tweets, profile characteristics, and several other known features.
Ferrara et al. [24] , proposes a machine learning framework to detect promoted campaigns and separate them from organic ones. In this study, topics are grouped by hashtags, which suggests that this method is applicable only to Twitter or to an OSM that uses similar tags. A number of features are presented such as: network and diffusion-based, user account (profile) properties, sentiment and content.
While [18] and [24] tackle the problem of information credibility in online social media, we have identified the following limitations: both approaches use sentiment analysis which make them language-dependent. Moreover, the need of information about the online profile (i.e. number of friends and followers) limit the applicability of these solutions to a specific OSM platform, since each platform possess different properties for describing their profiles. In our approach on the other hand, four out of five of the proposed similarity functions rely on text properties, such as term probability distributions, term co-occurrences, etc. Making our framework capable of working in multiple languages and different OSM platforms.
III. PROPOSED METHOD In this paper we propose an approach for discriminating between online discussions artificially promoted by employing crowdturfers and those that attract the authentic interest of OSM accounts. In order to identify malicious manipulation of online discussions we propose an approach based on estimating the prevalence of abusers among the OSM accounts, which contributed to the given online discussion. Next, we introduce our general approach (as depicted in Figure 1 ) here and elaborate upon it further in the subsections that follow. The first step in any OSM analysis process is the data collection. Methods for collecting OSM data are out of the scope of current research. In Section IV-A we describe the datasets used in this study.
In order to identify online discussions we use topic detection algorithms such as Latent Dirichlet Allocation or Latent Semantic Analysis. It is also possible to identify specific online discussion topics using predefined sets of keywords.
Provided the OSM data consisting of posts and their accounts, as well as the partitioning of posts into topics the proposed method consists of three major steps (outlined with bold in Figure 1 ): (1) ground truth OSM account labeling; (2) extrapolating the ground truth labels in order to quantify the authenticity of all OSM accounts in the dataset; and finally (3) generating the authenticity distribution in every topic.
A. Account Labeling
We propose two alternative approaches for creating a labeled dataset of OSM accounts. These accounts can be used to train a machine learning classifier or to directly estimate the authenticity of the rest of the accounts in the dataset, as we do in current paper. The first labeling approach is based on manual inspection of a small subset of the accounts. We address two primary challenges in this approach: strict unambiguous labeling guidelines and selection of accounts for labeling. The second approach is based on acquiring a collection of OSM accounts that with absolute certainty participate in crowdturfing platforms.
1) Manual Labeling Guidelines: Next, we provide a list of guidelines for manual classification of an OSM account as an abuser or a legitimate account. Figure 2 displays the manual labeling process.
(1) If the account explicitly mentions that it is a bot in its profile description, then we assume it is a benign automated account. We mark it as legitimate because the account does not deceive the OSM readers regarding its nature.
(2) If an OSM account declares itself as a news feed or any other type of content aggregator and most of its published posts can be identified as news published by major trusted news sites, then we label it as a legitimate, otherwise, we mark it as an abuser. If no clear decision can be made regarding the source and nature of the news, the account remains unlabeled.
(3) If the account claims to be a company profile, this claim is validated as follows: (3.1) Validate that the account description links to an official website of the company. (3.2) Search for the company's official home page, contact us page, press releases, and product pages for a reference to the investigated Twitter account. If such reference is found, the account is legitimate. Otherwise, it is considered a deceptive account and marked as an abuser.
(4) Next, we inspect the account's behavior. If there clear signs of automation, e.g., posting every five minutes twentyfour hours a day, or the account exhibits behavior infeasible for a human user we label it as an abuser.
(5) If there are many advertisements or re-posts with marketing information alongside neutral, or personal looking posts it is an evidence that the account is involved in spam or crowdturfing activities. It is important to note that some users install programs that post on their behalf. In such cases, the accounts exhibits both human-like and non-human behavior patterns. OSM accounts operated by naive users, which grant permissions to untrusted third party applications are plums for spammers and crowdturfing platforms. Thus, even if the OSM account shows some human behavior, but has also frequent automated re-posts or many advertisements, we treat it as an abuser.
(6) Finally, if the majority of the posts published by the account contain authentic content, for example, if traces of the same personal content are found in other online social networks, we label it as a legitimate. Having reliable labels for legitimate accounts is important for training some supervised machine learning classifiers.
Unfortunately, it is not always possible to determine with absolute certainty whether or not an OSM account is legitimate. If none of the conditions apply or we have any doubt regarding a given account it remains unlabeled.
We used the Committee of Experts approach in order to reach an agreement on the account labeles. Four experts (students) participated in the manual labeling process. Three of the experts independently reviewed the same groups of unlabeled accounts and analyzed their Twitter profiles and posts. The experts then assigned a label of either legitimate account or abuser to each account, following the guidelines illustrated in the flowchart in Figure 2 . Later, the fourth expert reviewed the labels provided to each account and the reasons for these labels. In case of full or almost full agreement among the experts the label was set according to majority vote. In case of a reasonable doubt the account was not labeled.
2) Account Selection for Manual Labeling: Careful manual labeling of OSM accounts is laborious process. Moreover, the manual labeling process described above may not reach concensus in many cases. This significantly limits the number of accounts that can be conclusively labeled.
Small sample of labeled instances randomly selected from a dataset may not represent all sections of the population. In order to have the highest variability among labeled accounts we first, cluster the OSM accounts and select a sample of of accounts from each cluster. While some clusters contain account which can easily be labeled based on the above guidelines, other clusters may contain accounts whose legitimacy is hard to determine even after manual inspection. We select more account from the latter clusters in order to eventually have a representative set of labeled accounts.
Clustering of the accounts can be performed based on features extracted from the OSM account profile. Several studies found that profile information is useful for the identification of abusers [6] , [13] . We used features that were reported to perform well in the past [6] , [7] , [21] . These features include: account age, number of followers, number of friends, friend-follower ratio, total number of posts, whether the profile configuration is personalized or default, whether the profile image is personalized or default, number of lists, whether the account has been verified by the social network, length of the screen name, average minutes between posts, average posts published during the total lifetime of the account, average posts published on days that the account has been active, and number of re-posts received.
3) Verified Abusers: In order to acquire a sample set of verified abusers one can directly utilize the crowdturfing services as an alternative to the account labeling. The idea is very similar to the use of honeypots for attracting spammers, but in this case we actively invite abusers to fall into the trap.
First, we create several public Twitter accounts (honeypots) and publish posts that contain clearly identified unique keywords. Then, we buy followers and re-posts from major crowdturfing sites such as: intertwitter.com, fastfollowerz.com, socialshop.co, socioblend.com, coincrack.com, and retweets.pro. Since the accounts we created have no online activity, all followers that they have a short while after engaging with the crowdturfing sites are crowdturfers. Similarly, we search Twitter for the unique keywords and mark as an abuser any account that posted these keywords during the next few days after engaging with the crowdturfing sites.
There are a few points that need to be treaten carefully when using this approach to collect abusers' data. (1) Keywords contained in the posts published by honeypot account must be unique in order to avoid false labeling. (2) The number of acquired followers and re-posts should be modest enough to remain under the radar of OSM trend analysis engines and various content aggregators. Otherwise, an aggressive campaign promoted by crwodturfers can attract the attention of legitimate accounts or content aggregators of sorts and hinder the purity of the abusers set. (3) It is important to consult the ethical committee when performing this kind of data collection. For example, the identify of the abusers must remain hidden, as well as the unique keywords used in the study. Please see Section V for additional ethical considerations. (4) Some of the accounts used for crowdturfing are short lived. They are blocked by OSM providers after 1-3 weeks after they are initially used for crowdturfing. We have chosen to ignore such accounts in order to focus on the more advanced abusers that avoid being detected. (5) Finally, this study focuses primarily on text based comparative analysis of OSM accounts. Thus, we disregard accounts, which published a small number (less than thirty) of posts.
B. Account Similarity Functions
We begin this section with a few definitions. Let A denote the set of accounts in the dataset. Let P denote the collection of posts published by these accounts. P (x) ⊆ P denotes the collection of posts published by account x ∈ A. For every post p ∈ P , A(p) denotes its author. We consider two posts equal (p x = p y ) if their text is equal after stemming and stop-words removal. In order to estimate the authenticity of accounts we investigated multiple similarity functions. The similarity functions are defined over pairs of accounts f :
A good similarity function f (x, y) would return a low value if x ∈ A and y ∈ A belong to different class, e.g., x is an abuser and y is legitimate, or vise versa. Similarly, high value of f (x, y) should indicate that x and y are belong to the same class with high likelihood. In this study we used five different similarity functions: common-posts, topic-distribution, profileproperties, behavioral-characteristics, and bag-of-words.
Example 1: Consider for example OSM accounts and their posts presented in Figure 3 . Accounts (ovals) point to their posts. Accounts may have properties associated with them, e.g., number of friends, followers and the time since the account was created. A2 was labeled as an abuser and A5 is a legitimate account. A1, A3, and A4 are unlabeled. We will use this example to demonstrate the similarity functions. Fig. 3 . Example of information collected from Twitter 1) Common posts: OSM accounts that publish the same content might be part of a crowdturfing campaign [14] , [25] . A similarity function termed common-posts shows which OSM accounts spread the same content across OSM. We use the Jaccard coefficient to normalize the number of common posts.
common-posts(x, y) =
|P (x) ∩ P (y)| |P (x) ∪ P (y)| Example 2: Consider the example in Figure 3 . A2 has one post in common with A1, despite the minor differences in the posts' text.
2) Bag-of-words: Common posts may work well for identifying groups of cooperating spammers or simple bots used to promote a product or a website through search engine optimization. However, this function may fail to detect human operated accounts that are employed in the same campaign due to the text variability in the crowdturfers' posts. Nevertheless, abusers that participate in the same crowdturfing campaign would use roughly similar vocabularies.
In order to quantify the similarity of vocabularies used by different accounts we employ the bag-of-words approach. According to this approach all the content posted by a given account is transformed into a set of terms. We denote the set of stemmed terms used in a post p ∈ P as W (p). We assume that W (p) does not contain stop-words. We define the vocabulary W (x) of an account x ∈ A as the collection of all terms used by this account in the given dataset W (x) = p∈P W (p). We use Jaccard coefficient to quantify the similarity between the vocabularies used by two accounts:
bag-of -words(x, y) = |W (x) ∩ W (y)| |W (x) ∪ W (y)| Hashtags and URLs are considered as terms for this purpose and are not stemmed.
Example 3: Consider the accounts A1 and A3 in Figure 3 . The term video and URL1 are used by both. This, these, a, just, seem are stop-words leaving 9 terms, including URLs that were used by either A1 or A3. Thus, the bag-of-words similarity betweens them is: bag-of -words(A1, A3) = 2 9
3) Topic-distribution: The next similarity function compares the topical distributions of posts published by each account. While bag-of-words roughly compares which terms are used by two accounts here we consider the usage frequencies as well.
The LDA algorithm for topic detection determines the probability of each vocabulary term to be used in each topic. Based on these term-in-topic probabilities LDA-based topic detection determines the probability T p,i that the post p belongs to topic i. Next, for each OSM account x and each topic i we compute the average probability that x's posts belong to topic i.
Finally, for each pair of accounts x, y, we measure the similarity between vectors T x and T y using cosine similarity.
topic-distr(x, y) = cosine similarity(T x , T y )
Although, any kernel function can be used to compare between vector representations of accounts we use only cosine similarity in the rest of this section. Other kernel functions we have tried during this study produced similar results. 4) Profile features: Accounts can be compared based on the features extracted from their OSM profiles. We used profile features that were shown to assist well in account type classification in the past [6] , [7] , [21] . The features are listed in Section III-A2. Let − → x p and − → x p represent the profile feature vectors of the accounts x and y respectively. We use cosine similarity to compare between these two vectors.
prof ile-prop(x, y) = cosine similarity( − → x p , − → y p ) Example 4: Example profile features are listed above the accounts in Figure 3 . According to these features A1 is more similar to A5 than to A2, having prof ile-prop(A1, A5) = 0.95 and prof ile-prop(A1, A2) = 0.03 respectively. 5) Behavioral characteristics: Techniques relying features that describe account behavior were also useful for the identification of OSM abusers [6] , [7] . These features include: total number of re-posts, average number of re-posts, average number of hashtags, average number of hyper-links, average user mentions, and average post length. Similar to prof ile-prop, we use cosine similarity to compare between the account behavior feature vectors.
where − → x b and − → y b are vectors of features describing the account behavior.
C. Authenticity of Accounts and Topics
In order to estimate the authenticity of accounts in the dataset we compare them using similarity functions, presented in Section III-B, to labeled accounts, discussed in Section III-A. The simplest and most intuitive algorithm that can be applied in these settings is K-Nearest Neighbors (KNN). According to this algorithm, for each unlabeled account x we select k most similar labeled accounts (nearest neighbors). Then, x receives the label of the majority of the nearest neighbors. This approach results in quite accurate classification as will be discussed in Section IV. Nevertheless, for the purpose of this study binary classification is not sufficient. Since many accounts are partially legitimate (partially abusers) we can use the classification confidence as the measure for authenticity of an account.
More specifically we define authenticity of the account x as the confidence of x being legitimate account. Since this paper focuses on account similarity functions, we choose among the variety of KNN confidence measures [26] . The choice of the specific confidence measure is guided by the characteristics of our problem domain. First, the number of labeled accounts is rather limited, especially if we choose the manual labeling approach. Second, the similarity to the labeled accounts contains important information that should be considered. The similarity values are especially important in case we choose the verified abusers labeling approach, because in that case one-class classifiers need to be considered relying only on the distances to abusers. Finally, we acknowledge the fact that there are many sub-types of abusers and legitimate accounts. This is clearly indicated by the multi-step manual labeling process presented earlier. Thus, we should not rely on similarity of the tested account to distant labeled instances of each class, but only consider the similarity to the nearest neighbors.
We choose the confidence measure similar to the one defined by Arlandis et al. [27] which satisfies the above considerations.
is the set of known abusers among the nearest neighbors, and f is the account similarity function. The constant factor is set to 0.5 in this equation in order to allow negative, as well as positive authenticity values (authenticity(x) ∈ [−0.5, 0.5]).
The last step of the proposed approach is aggregating the authenticity of individual OSM accounts into authenticity of topics. While there are multiple aggregation options we consider the following two aggregations: a) Post level aggragation: Every post is associated the authenticity of its author. The authenticities are accumulated based on the post in topic probabilities.
b) Author level aggragation: First, a set of authors of posts in a specific topic is determined. Then authenticities of the author accounts are aggregated. We define the set of accounts involved in a specific topic i as
Here, every post is associated with a single topic -the one it belongs to with the highest probability. An account is associated with a topic if at least one of its posts is associated with that topic. The account level authenticity of the topic i is then determined as follows:
topic-auth-2(i) = x∈D(i) acc-auth(x).
(
We do not distinguish between authentic and malicious posts published by the same account. Thus, in case of partially automated accounts and casual crowdturfers, even topics where they express their authentic interest are polluted by their illegitimate activities. Future work may consider post classification into legitimate or a part of a crowdturfing campaign. We argue that information contained in a single post is often insufficient to perform accurate classification, especially in case of human operated crowdturfing accounts.
The proposed post level topic authenticity has higher granularity and is more robust because it considers the affinity of a post to every topic. In contrast, the author level aggregation may introduce more noise in small datasets, because it disregards the lesser post to topic affinities. Neverhteless, author level aggregation is important as it reduces the weight of accounts aggresively publishing on a specific topic.
IV. DEMONSTRATION
In this section we evaluate the investigated account similarity functions on three Twitter datasets and demonstrate the topic authenticity estimation.
A. Datasets
Three datasets were used for evaluation of the author similarity functions. Two of them contain the same unlabeled accounts and their posts, but two different sets of labeled accounts corresponding to Manually Labeled Accounts and Verified Abusers discussed in Section III-A. This data was collected for the purpose of this study. The third, Arabic Honeypot dataset [17] , was used for validation of the results.
For the purpose of this study we collected Twitter data over a period of five months (from April 25 to September 19, 2016). 5 We collected tweets containing either one of the key phrases: 'Online TV', 'Internet TV' and 'Smart TV'. We denote this dataset as the Virtual TV domain in the following discussions. This domain was chosen because it contains many tweets published by both abusers and legitimate accounts.
We used the Twitter REST API 6 to collect the profile features listed in Section III-A2. Overall, the Virtual TV dataset contained 89,111 accounts, and 188,211 tweets which were published by these accounts. Following the manual labeling process presented in Section III-A1, we identified 289 abusers and 316 legitimate accounts.
In order to form the set of verified abuser accounts, we created nine public Twitter accounts, which published a total of 53 posts. Using crowdturfing sites, we hired 3,169 Twitter abusers, to follow those accounts, and/or re-post their posts. 1,968 of the verified abusers were blocked by Twitter during the period of May-September, 2016. These accounts are disregarded in current study because, with the exception of the posts that we paid for, the data does not include their posts or profile information. The other 1,201 accounts remain active as of the time of this paper's writing.
Four out of five similarity functions used in this study rely on posts. Thus, we disregard 195 accounts, which published less than thirty posts in their lifetime. Overall, our dataset contains 1,006 active Twitter accounts of verified abusers with more than thirty posts each. In addition, the dataset also contains 1,068 additional accounts that posted on the 'Virtual TV' domain. We consider these accounts as legitimate accounts for the sake of this study.
In addition to the Twitter data described above we used the Arabic Honeypot dataset provided by Morstatter et al. [17] . This data was collected using a honeypot network. Morstatter et al. reported that the dataset contained 6,285 accounts, and 725,179 Twitter posts published by those accounts. Because this dataset only contained the Twitter account ID, and Twitter post ID, the Twitter REST API service was used in order to obtain the missing information about the accounts and posts. Only 5, 270 Twitter accounts out of the 6,285 are still operational. Next we filtered out 1,144 of the 5,270 accounts if the accounts were suspended, the privacy settings were changed to protected, preventing us from collecting their private posts, or the accounts had less than thirty posts for analysis. Overall, 5 Crawled with the help of VICO Research & Consulting GmbH http://www.vico-research.com/. 6 https://dev.twitter.com/rest/public we collected 652,128 posts from 4,126 accounts, among them 2,042 abusers, and 2,084 legitimate accounts. A summary of all datasets used in this study is presented in Table I .
B. Account Classification
We evaluate the account similarity functions presented in Section III-B by applying a KNN classifier (with (1 ≤ k ≤ 5). The size of the training set has varied from 1% to 40% of the labeled accounts in each dataset. Every evaluation round was executed five times with different randomly selected training sets. The performance indicators used are the Area under ROC curve (AUC) and F1 measures. Figure 4 presents the average performance of the similarity functions for Manually Labeled Accounts, Verified Abusers, and Arabic Honeypot. The x-axis shows corresponds to percent of labeled accounts used as a training set. The y-axis corresponds to the AUC (left) and the F1 measure (right). In all datasets bag-of-words is the superior similarity function according to both AUC and F1 measures. It also has the lowest standard deviation of both AUC and F1 ranging from 0.002 to 0.016 across all datasets and it outperforms by a large fraction both the simpler common-posts similarity functions and the more sophisticated topic-distr similarity function. It is interesting to note that common-posts is the worst similarity function for detecting abusers who are employed through the crowdturfing platforms. This observation Surprisingly, high performance of the common-posts similarity function suggests that the number of automated accounts is relatively high in this dataset.
C. Topic Authenticity
We measured the topic authenticity for the Virtual TV data set described in Section IV-A. The Arabic Honeypots data set was not included in this analysis because (1) the researchers lack knowledge of the Arabic language and could not qualitatively validate the calculated topic authenticity and (2) LDA seem to perform poorly on this data set without without proper tuning. The number of topics in the collected Virtual TV data was optimized empirically to produce 48 coherent topics. Based on the Manually Labeled Accounts train set we computed authenticity score for each unlabeled author in the data set. Bag-of-words similarity function was used for this purpose because it provided the best performance in terms of AUC and F1.
In order to visually represent the authenticity of each topic we used donut charts as depicted in Figure 5 . For the sake of brevity we show the authenticity distribution of six topics out of the 48. In the middle of each donut chart we include the word cloud representing the topic. Words are sized based on their probability in the of occurance within the topic. The inner cycle of the donut chart enclosing each word cloud represents the account authenticity distribution as taken into account by Equation 2. Similarly, the outer cycle depicts the post level authenticity distribution as taken into account by Equation 1.
We can see, that in some cases (e.g. topics 1,2, and 4) the fraction of posts is disproportional to the fraction of accounts having the same authenticity level. This means that few accounts (legitimate in case of topic 1 and abusers in case of topic 4) took over the discussion in these topics and might have had strong influence on the rest of the authors who wrote on this topic. Overall, it is easy to distinguish between topics where most participating accounts are legitimate and topics overwhelmed by abusers. For example, the discussions about online support platform seem to be authentic. On the contrary, topics mentioning Amazon and bidding are highly promoted by OSM abusers as expected. Statistical analysis of the authenticity distributions using ANOVA identified groups of topics with online discussions that contain commercial content (mostely prone to abusers) and groups of discussions that raise little financial interest (mostely authentic). These results show that the proposed analytical pipline for topic authenticity estimation makes sense. Further studies can employ the suggested approach to detect OSM manipulation in politics and various other domains. V. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS Collecting data from OSM has raised ethical concerns in recent years [28] , [29] . In order to minimize the potential risks that may arise from such activities, this study follows recommendations presented by [30] and [31] , which deal with ethical challenges regarding OSM, and Internet communities.
In this study VICO Research & Consulting GmbH provided publicly available posts from Twitter. To obtain missing information about accounts and their posts, we used the Twitter REST API which only provides public information. This means that we do not collect the information of accounts that do not agree to share their information publicly.
The Arabic Honeypot dataset made available to the research community lacks accounts' identifiable properties; in addition, in the published dataset we replaced all tweets that appear less than 20 times on Twitter with words randomly selected from the topic's word distribution.
The research protocol was approved by the Ben-Gurion University of the Negev Human Research Ethics Committee.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this study we demonstrated topics authenticity on three Twitter datasets. Based on the results we can draw the following conclusions: First, the similarity function that provided the best performance was the bag-of-words, which obtained the highest average AUC and F1, and the lowest standard deviation on each of the datasets (see Sections IV-B). These results demonstrate that the bag-of-words is the optimal similarity function for measuring the accounts' authenticity among the five similarity functions we measured. Another advantage of the bag-of-words is that there is no need for domain knowledge and feature extraction, as opposed to other similarity functions such as behavior-prop and profile-prop.
Second, with regard to the AUC and F1 performance measures, in the Acquired Abusers dataset we obtained to almost 1, as opposed to the two other datasets which obtained about 0.8 of the AUC and F1. We believe that the high performance of the Acquired Abusers dataset was due to the composition of accounts provided by crowdturfing sites which were actually simple bots. The characteristics of simple bots are likely easier to identify than the more sophisticated abusers found in other datasets used in our evaluation.
Third, by using our proposed method we succeeded to differentiate between topics that are prone to OSM manipulation and topics that attract authentic public interest. Moreover, due to the fact that our proposed method include manual labeling process that contains clustering analysis, even with small number of labeled abusers we can detect manipulated topics.
In the future, we plan to evaluate the presented approach on additional datasets spanning multiple social networks, and compare the topics authenticity across multiple domains such as politics, sports, etc. In addition, we think that it will be interesting to understand whether the abusers follow the same pattern in other domains. Moreover, we aim to incorporate the capability of detecting camouflaged abusers into our approach. Also we would like to measure the use of bag-of-words for clustering analysis in order to improve the provided clusters.
